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LEGISLATION - MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES - CITY OF MOBILE PASSES ORDI-
NANCE OUTLAWING USE OF SPIKE-HEELED SHOES UNLESS WAIVER IS SIGNED
RELEASING CITY FROM LIABILITY FOR INJURIES INCURRED BY WEARER - The ordi-
nance here considered, currently in effect in Mobile, Alabama, prohibits the wearing
of spike-heeled women's shoes on the public streets and walks of the city.: However,
section two of the ordinance permits the wearing of such shoes if the wearer secures
a permit from the city. Permits are issued without cost upon the signing of a re-
lease absolving the city from any liability for injury incurred by the wearer or
another resulting from a fall while wearing the shoes.
2
Courts seem to be adopting a more liberal attitude toward plaintiffs in actions
against municipal corporations. The narrow liability of a city or town which once
prevailed has been greatly expanded. With it has come a heavy burden upon the
finances of the municipalities. Numerous and high judgments seriously deplete the
funds available for city government, bring sharply increased taxes, and cause a de-
cline in the services afforded by the municipalities.3 Presumably this Mobile ordi-
nance, prompted by these considerations, is an attempt to defend that city against
expensive litigation and costly judgments.
For purposes of tort liability courts usually divide the functions of municipal
1 AN ORDINANCE
To prohibit the wearing of shoes with heels in excess of certain limitations upon the
public streets of the City of Mobile and to provide for permits for the wearing of such
shoes under certain conditions.
BE IT ORDAINED BY THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF
MOBILE AS FOLLOWS:
SECTION 1. That the wearing of shoes with heels which measure more than one and
one-half inch in height and less than one inch in diameter on the wearing surface upon
the public streets and sidewalks of the City of Mobile is hereby prohibited.
SECTION 2. -Any person desiring to wear shoes with heels in excess of the limitations
set out in section one above may do so by obtaining a permit from the City of Mobile
and by agreeing that upon the issuance of such permit that they thereby relieve the City
of Mobile from any and all liability for damages to themselves or to others caused by their
falling upon the public streets or sidewalks of the City of Mobile while wearing such shoes.
Duly adopted this the 13th day of October 1959.
ATTEST: 10/15/59
/s/ Jos. N. Langan
MAYOR
/s! S. H. Hendrix
City Clerk
2 STATE OF ALABAMA)
COUNTY OF MOBILE
The undersigned, in consideration of a permit granted by the City of Mobile
to allow the undersigned to wear shoes with heels which are in excess of 1 '/ in. in height
or less than 1 in. in diameter upon the streets of the City of. Mobile, does hereby release
the City of Mobile from any and all claims of damages which may be caused by the under-
signed falling upon the streets or sidewalks in the City of Mobile while wearing such shoes.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have executed this release on this the ..................
day of ... .................. .-... 1..........9. .............................. 19 .. ...
.........................................................................................
---------------------...... having released the City of Mobile
from any claims for damages arising from her wearing shoes with heels thereon which are
prohibited by City ordinance, the City of Mobile does hereby grant a permit to said person
allowing her to wear shoes with heels in excess of the limits set by ordinance upon her
assuming all liability therefor.
D ate: .......................................................
City Clerk3 Walsh, Trends in Municipal Tort Liability, IN~s. L.J. (1958).
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government into two categories, governmental and proprietary. Activities which
are properly the concern of the governmental body, acting in the interest of the
public alone, are termed governmental. The enacting and enforcing of laws, the
operation of public institutions, and planning for the orderly operation and expan-
sion of the municipality are instances of governmental activity. As a general rule
the municipality incurs no tort liability for negligence or breach of duty in regard
to these activities. 4 On the other hand, the municipality performs certain functions
which might also be conducted by private persons. Such functions are termed pro-
prietary and are the types of activities for the negligent conduct of which the gov-
ernment might incur liability.5 Various reasons are advanced for the distinction and
the writers seem to agree that no certain or strictly logical basis can be found.6
Equally obscure is the line which marks the distinction between those activities which
are governmental and those which are proprietary. However, this is the usual divid-
ing line drawn by legislatures and courts to separate municipal immunity and lia-
bility as to tort claims. Municipalities are generally liable for defects in streets and
sidewalks.7 In Alabama, towns and cities are made liable for injuries caused by
defective streets by state statute.8
Municipal tort liability is based on negligence and thus involves the violation
of a duty. Interestingly enough, the elements necessary for recovery against a city
in Alabama, applicable in almost every state, were set down by the Supreme Court
of Alabama in a case involving the City of Mobile. In City of Mobile v. McClure,
the court said: "Every action in tort consists of three elements: (1) The existence
of a legal duty by defendant to plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) dam-
age as a proximate result." 9 To this must be added the reminder that the plaintiff
must be free from contributory negligence. Also, the negligence of a municipality
is of such a nature that certain formal requirements are often stipulated as pre-
requisites to a valid claim. For example, the city may require notice of the defect
or it must have existed for such a length of time that the city can be charged with
notice.10
As has been stated, the duty to care for the streets is present - in Alabama by
statute, and in most states by statute and/or judicial interpretation.1 1 The general
rule, uniformly supported by judicial decision, is that this duty is adequately dis-
charged if the municipality exercises ordinary care to keep the streets and sidewalks
in a reasonably safe condition for travel in the usual mode.'2
Having set out the duty which is imposed on the city of Mobile, the next step
is to consider the purpose and effect of the statute in order to test its validity. By
means of this ordinance, Mobile attempts to declare the wearing of high-heeled
shoes a separate and distinct mode of travel. Having declared this a particular
mode of travel, the ordinance then makes it illegal. Thus the city is no longer under
a duty to keep the streets safe for the wearers of high-heeled shoes because the duty
imposed upon municipalities does not extend to modes of travel which are unlaw-
4 18 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.24 (3d ed. 1950); 2 HARPER, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 29.6 (1956).
5 18 MCQUILLAN, Op. cit. supra note 4, § 53.23; 2 HARPER, op. cit. supra note 4, § 29.6.
6 2 HARPER, op. cit. supra, § 29.6. See texts cited in n. 1.
7 19 MCQUILLAN, op. cit. supra note 4, 54.01; 2 HARPER, op. cit. supra note 4§ 29.6. The question as to whether this is so because their upkeep is regarded as a proprietary
function or because they are treated as an exception to the general rule regarding govern-
mental activities is beyond the scope of this comment. It is interesting to note that the con-
ditions of streets and walks has been singled out as sufficiently important to regard as a ground
for liability irrespective of the rationale.
8 ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 502 (1940).
9 City of Mobile v. McClure, 221 Ala. 51, 127 So. 832, 833 (1930).
10 ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 502 (1940). The "written prior notice" rule has been upheld.
See Fullerton v. City of Schenectady, 138 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1955), aff'd, 309 N.Y. 701, 128
N.E.2d 413 (1955), appeal denied, 350 U.S. 980 (1956).
11 2 HARPER, op. cit. supra note 4, § 2916.
12 18 MCQUMLAN, op. cit. supra note 4, § 54.11, and cases cited in n. 62.
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ful.13 By reason of its governmental function Mobile has changed or lessened the
duty which it owes in its proprietary function.
The question which presents itself is the power of the city to do this. It is
submitted that high-heeled shoes are a regular item of dress for a woman making
any kind of public appearance. While the height and width of the heel may vary
with the age and physical characteristics of the wearer, many heels are of the spike
variety and would be covered by the provisions of this ordinance. The most casual
observation would support these contentions and statistics could provide incontro-
vertible evidence. Accepting the contentions, the argument becomes that, as high-
heeled shoes are now an accepted part of a woman's attire, municipalities, rather
than banning their wear, ought to provide that they may be worn safely. Just as
there is technological growth in our society, as evidenced by the use of the automo-
bile rather than the horse and buggy, so too there is growth or change in costume
or fashion. The government which has responded to one change with wider and
better paved highways ought to respond to the other with more defect-free pave-
ments. The government should exist for the promoting of the good life for its
citizens. If the women have expressed a preference for this type of shoe and the
men a desire to see them so attired, the government should not hinder but provide
for the trend.
Yet the matter is not so simply stated. The proper response of government is
not always ascertained on a numerical basis. That which many might wish done
is not always the best policy. Involved here is the often debated question of the
individual and society and the role which government should play in regulating the
activities of the individual. Presumably ethical and moral considerations are not
raised in this context, but a number of practical considerations are involved, of the
type which lie behind many local ordinances. Ordinances prohibit many kinds of
activities, not because they are inherently wrong, but because under existing condi-
tions, and in order to further greater goods which are common to all, they are
properly sacrificed. Consider as an example the ordinances which require that dogs
be leashed, or those which prohibit the sale and use of fireworks, or those which
regulate the parking of cars on city streets. The instant situation may be somewhat
analogous. It is indeed good that women wear high-heeled shoes if they desire to
do so. But it is of paramount importance that the women of the municipality be
of sound body and that pedestrians be spared possible injury as a result of the stum-
ble and fall of a fellow pedestrian. It is a fact that a city may have miles of pave-
ment, that a constant check for defects would be impossible, that the cost of re-
pairing such a slight defect as may catch a slim heel could be prohibitive, and that
the gratings and trap doors which probably cause many of the accidents serve a
very functional purpose. Viewed in this way, there may be just cause for the pro-
hibition despite the general desire of women to wear this type of shoe.
However, the legality of the specific provisions of this ordinance is question-
able. Section one forbids the wearing of spike-heeled shoes. But section two
promptly reverses this and permits the wearing of these heels upon con-
dition that the wearer release the city from all possible liability arising from
a fall. What, then, is the purpose of the ordinance? Is it reasonable and proper in
the public interest and in conformity with state law? 14 If the wearing of such shoes
is so dangerous to public interests that it must be forbidden by law, can it be any less
dangerous when the wearer has signed a release? It is readily apparent that the
danger is not the threat of harm to the individual but the threat of financial harm
13 Hunt v. St. Louis, 278 Mo. 213, 211 S.W. 673, 677 (1919).
14 An ordinance must be a reasonable exercise of the power to enact it and must not
conflict with the existing laws of the state. While the presumption is in favor of the validity
of the ordinance, it is subject to challenge. Giglio v. Barrett, 207 Ala. 278, 92 So. 668 (1922).
See 5 MCQUILLAN, op. cit. supra note 4, ch. 18.
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to the city. Granting that the preservation of city funds is a legitimate goal, yet how
does it compare with the aforementioned municipal responsibilities?
A state statute has imposed upon the municipality a rather strict duty to keep
its streets and walks in reasonable condition. For the breach of this duty the city
will incur financial liability. The city may limit its duty by limiting the modes of
travel which are permissible upon the streets. Yet, the criterion for limiting travel
must be something other than the likelihood that this type of conduct will produce
damage claims against city funds, for city funds have been subjected to damage
claims by statutory provision. It has been suggested that a legitimate reason for
limiting the mode of travel is the public interest in the physical well-being of its citi-
zens, which, in the practical order of things, cannot be assured other than by pro-
hibiting this type of activity. If this is the standard, the ordinance defeats itself for
it fails to achieve its purpose by the terms of its own provisions. Upon the signing
of a release it permits the conduct which is declared to be dangerous to physical
well-being. Obviously, then, no reason exists to support this limitation upon per-
sonal conduct other than the desire to spare the city liability. Since liability is im-
posed by statute this reason should not suffice and the ordinance should be struck
down as unreasonable.
A more interesting situation would have been presented if the ordinance had
simply forbidden the wearing of spike-heeled shoes, making no provisions for permits
and waiver of liability. The city need not enforce the ordinance but when a pedes-
trian is injured while violating it, the city would defend on the grounds of per se
contributory negligence. It seems fairly well settled that non-enforcement of an or-
dinance does not destroy its effect as law.1 5 Of course, the plaintiff could still argue
that the law was unreasonable. But the city in replying to such an argument would
not be met with the inconsistency so apparent on the face of this ordinance. In
considering the argument that such an ordinance was unreasonable the court could
take notice of all the surrounding factors. In light of the statute fixing liability
upon a municipality for improper care of the streets, and upon a showing that high-
heeled shoes were the usual footwear, coupled with the fact that the ordinance was
never enforced, a court might decide that the sole purpose of the ordinance was to
enable the municipality to evade its responsibilities. Certainly, however, a plaintiff's
case would lack the force which it would have in attacking the present ordinance.
The inconsistency on the face of this ordinance, which might have been avoided,
prompts a query as to why it was drawn in this manner. The only answer would
seem to be that the legislative body was hoping people would avail themselves of
the permit provisions and sign the waivers. Since the ordinance sets no penalty for
violation of section one, this is very unlikely unless people are motivated by sheer
respect for the law. Those who sign releases would give up all chance of recovery.
Unlikely as it is that people will sign the waivers, it seems to be the only reason for
the present form of the ordinance. If waivers are signed, and upheld in court, the
city has achieved a great deal. First, those who have signed are not as likely to
institute any proceedings, especially on small claims. Far more important than this,
the waiver is a "catch-all." In order to successfully plead the affirmative defense
of contributory negligence by violation of a statute the city must prove certain facts.
It must show that the ordinance was designed to protect the plaintiff, and to protect
her from the type of injury which she sustained. 16 In short, the city must establish
a causal relationship between a violation of the ordinance and the injury incurred.
The release disregards causal relationships. It provides for release of all claims
against the City of Mobile arising from falls upon the streets and sidewalks "while
wearing such shoes." If the release is literally construed the signer has no claim
even though her fall was not caused by the wearing of the high-heeled shoes.
15 Hayne v. Wurstener, 63 N.E.2d 229 (Ohio App. 1945).
16 This is the general rule for per se negligence. Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126
N.E. 814 (1920). It has been extended to cover contributory negligence when the plaintiff
is in violation of the law. Le Tourneau v. Johnston, 185 Minn. 46, 239 N.W. 768 (1931).
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The chance which the municipality took of compromising the validity of the
entire ordinance in order to insert this release provision, and the broad release which
is demanded, gives rise to suspicions as to whether the ordinance was aimed at high-
heeled shoes at all. Rather, it seems that it was aimed at destroying the claims of
all women injured upon the city streets. The attack centers around these shoes, not
because they cause the injuries, but because women are usually wearing them when
they are injured. Note in this regard that the claimant whose injury is traceable to
the fact that she was wearing spike heels already bears a heavy burden. Undoubt-
edly the city will charge that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. To
refute this defense the plaintiff must show that she exercised due care for her own
safety commensurate with the prevailing conditions. Obviously, a woman wearing
high-heeled shoes is in a somewhat more precarious position than her sister traveler
in flat shoes. She is charged with the knowledge that every sidewalk contains a
number of small crevices, that there are at least slight variations in grading between
sidewalk blocks and that gratings are not infrequent. She must exercise a degree
of care commensurate with this situation. The fact that thousands of women in
high-heeled shoes negotiate these minor obstacles each day with unbroken stride is
some evidence that it can be done with a minimum of care. It is probably enough
evidence to show that the woman who falls prey to one of these pavement pitfalls
peculiar to high-heeled shoe wearers was guilty of contributory negligence. It seems
then, that in most of the cases in which relief is granted, the wearing of high-heeled
shoes did not play a major role. Though the victim may have been so attired, the
defect was probably serious, such as would catch a pedestrian regardless of her
footwear. For the courts to condone this attack upon high heels is to succumb to
a clever dodge. Injuries directly attributable to high heels can be handled on the
basis of contributory negligence without the aid of such ordinances. Legitimate
damage claims, arising as a result of the city's own negligence, should not be im-
perilled by directing attention to the victims' shoes. To permit this is to permit the
municipality to disregard its responsibility to the citizen.
John J. Coffey
